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Abstract
The HQC encryption framework is a general code-based encryption scheme for
which decryption returns a noisy version of the plaintext. Any instantiation of the
scheme will therefore use an error-correcting procedure relying on a fixed auxiliary
code. Unlike the McEliece encryption framework whose security is directly related to
how well one can hide the structure of an error-correcting code, the security reduc-
tion of the HQC encryption framework is independent of the nature of the auxiliary
decoding procedure which is publicly available. What is expected from it is that the
decoding algorithm is both efficient and has a decoding failure rate which can be eas-
ily modelized and analyzed. The original error-correction procedure proposed for the
HQC framework was to use tensor products of BCH codes and repetition codes. In this
paper we consider another code family for removing the error vector deriving from the
general framework: the concatenation of Reed-Muller and Reed-Solomon codes. We
denote this instantiation of the HQC framework by HQC-RMRS. These codes yield
better decoding results than the BCH and repetition codes: overall we gain roughly
17% in the size of the key and the ciphertext, while keeping a simple modelization of
the decoding error rate. The paper also presents a simplified and more precise analysis
of the distribution of the error vector output by the HQC protocol.
1 Introduction
The first code-based cryptosystem was proposed in 1978 by McEliece. The proposed frame-
work can be instantiated with any family of error-correcting codes having an efficient de-
coding algorithm. However, the security of the cryptosystem is highly dependent on the
choice of the family. Even though the original instantiation, based on Goppa codes, re-
mains secure, many others (for example using Reed-Muller or Reed-Solomon codes) have
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been broken by recovering the hidden structure of the code from the public key. The very
nature of this framework makes it difficult to reduce the security of the scheme to a general
decoding problem for random codes.
In [1], the authors propose a framework that can be instantiated in different metrics to
build cryptosystems whose security is reduced to decoding random quasi-cyclic codes. The
instantiation of this framework in the Hamming metric is HQC (Hamming Quasi Cyclic),
which was submitted to the second round of the NIST Post-Quantum Standardization
workshop. Thanks to the quasi-cyclic structure, the scheme features compact key sizes
(about 20,000 bits for a security of 128 bits) as well as fast keygen, encryption and decryption
operations.
A public structured error-correcting code C is needed to remove noise inherent to the
decryption process. In [1], the authors proposed tensor products of BCH and repetition
codes, because encoding is fast and they allow precise DFR analysis. The analysis consists
of two steps: first, the weight distribution of the error vector is studied, and then one
analyzes how well the chosen codes decode errors of a given weight.
Our contribution in this paper is twofold: we provide a better analysis of the distribution
of the weight of the error vector, which allows for a better DFR analysis regardless of which
public code is used to decode it, and we propose using a concatenation of Reed-Muller
and Reed-Solomon codes to decode the error: this code family allows one to reach a low
DFR (for example < 2−128) with shorter codes, hence leading to shorter public keys and
ciphertexts.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce necessary notation and the description of the HQC scheme.
For more details about the protocol and the security proof, we refer the reader to [1].
Notation: Throughout this document, Z denotes the ring of integers and F2 the binary
field. Additionally, we denote by ω(·) the Hamming weight of a vector i.e. the number of
its non-zero coordinates, and by Snw (F2) the set of words in Fn2 of weight w. Formally:
Snw (F2) = {v ∈ Fn2 , such that ω(v) = w} .
V denotes the vector space Fn2 of dimension n over F2 for some positive n ∈ Z. Elements of
V can be interchangeably considered as row vectors or polynomials in R = F2[X]/(Xn−1).
Vectors/Polynomials (resp. matrices) will be represented by lower-case (resp. upper-case)
bold letters. A prime integer n is said primitive if the polynomial Xn − 1/(X − 1) is
irreducible in F2[X].
For u,v ∈ V , we define their product similarly as in R, i.e. uv = w ∈ V with
wk =
∑
i+j≡k mod n
uivj, for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}. (1)
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Our new protocol takes great advantage of the cyclic structure of matrices. Following [1],
rot(h) for h ∈ V denotes the circulant matrix whose ith column is the vector corresponding
to hX i. This is captured by the following definition.
Definition 2.0.1 (Circulant Matrix). Let v = (v0, . . . , vn−1) ∈ Fn2 . The circulant matrix
induced by v is defined and denoted as follows:
rot(v) =

v0 vn−1 . . . v1
v1 v0 . . . v2
...
... . . .
...
vn−1 vn−2 . . . v0
 ∈ Fn×n2 (2)
As a consequence, it is easy to see that the product of any two elements u,v ∈ R can
be expressed as a usual vector-matrix (or matrix-vector) product using the rot(·) operator
as
u · v = u× rot(v)> = (rot(u)× v>)> = v × rot(u)> = v · u. (3)
We now recall the HQC scheme in figure 1. In [1], the code C used for decoding is a
tensor product of BCH and repetition codes. But since this code is public, its structure
has no incidence on security, and one can choose any code family, influencing only the
Decryption Failure Rate and the parameter sizes.
• Setup(1λ): generates and outputs the global parameters param= (n, k, δ, w, wr, we).
• KeyGen(param): samples h $← R, the generator matrix G ∈ Fk×n2 of C, sk =
(x,y)
$← R2 such that ω(x) = ω(y) = w, sets pk = (h, s = x+ h · y), and returns
(pk, sk).
• Encrypt(pk,m): generates e $← R, r = (r1, r2) $← R2 such that ω(e) = we and
ω(r1) = ω(r2) = wr, sets u = r1+h·r2 and v = mG+s · r2+e, returns c = (u,v).
• Decrypt(sk, c): returns C.Decode(v − u · y).
Figure 1: Description of HQC.
3 Analysis of the error vector distribution for Hamming
distance
From the description of the HQC framework, decryption corresponds to decoding the re-
ceived vector: v − u.y = mG+ e′ for the error vector e′ = x · r2 − r1 · y + e. In this sec-
tion we provide a more precise analysis of the error distribution approximation compared
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to [1]. We first compute exactly the probability distribution of each fixed coordinate e′k of
the error vector
e′ = x · r2 − r1 · y + e = (e′0, . . . e′n−1).
We obtain that every coordinate e′k is Bernoulli distributed with parameter p∗ = P [e′k = 1]
given by Proposition 3.2.1.
To compute decoding error probabilities, we will then need the probability distribution
of the weight of the error vector e′ restricted to given sets of coordinates that correspond
to codeword supports. We will make the simplifying assumption that the coordinates e′k
of e′ are independent variables, which will let us work with the binomial distribution of
parameter p∗ for the weight distributions of e′. This working assumption is justified by
remarking that, in the high weight regime relevant to us, since the component vectors x,y, e
have fixed weights, the probability that a given coordinate e′k takes the value 1 conditioned
on abnormally many others equalling 1 can realistically only be ≤ p∗. We support this
modeling of the otherwise intractable weight distribution of e′ by extensive simulations:
these back up our assumption that our computations of decoding error probabilities and
DFRs can only be upper bounds on their real values.
3.1 Analysis of the distribution of the product of two vectors
The vectors x,y, r1, r2, e have been taken uniformly random and independently chosen
among vectors of weight w, wr and we. We first evaluate the distributions of the products
x · r2 and r1 · y.
Proposition 3.1.1. Let x = (x0, . . . xn−1) be a random vector chosen uniformly among all
binary vectors of weight w and let r = (r0, . . . , rn−1) be a random vector chosen uniformly
among all vectors of weight wr and independently of x. Then, denoting z = x · r, we have
that for every k ∈ {0, . . . n − 1}, the k-th coordinate zk of z is Bernoulli distributed with
parameter p˜ = P (zk = 1) equal to:
p˜ =
1(
n
w
)(
n
wr
) ∑
16`6min(w,wr)
` odd
C`
where C` =
(
n
`
)(
n−`
w−`
)(
n−w
wr−`
)
.
Proof. The total number of ordered pairs (x, r) is
(
n
w
)(
n
wr
)
. Among those, we need to count
how many are such that zk = 1. We note that
zk =
∑
i+j=k mod n
0≤i,j≤n−1
xirj.
We need therefore to count the number of couples (x, r) such that we have xirk−i = 1 an
odd number of times when i ranges over {0, . . . , n − 1} (and k − i is understood modulo
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n). Let us count the number C` of couples (x, r) such that xirk−i = 1 exactly ` times. For
` > min(w,wr) we clearly have C` = 0. For ` ≤ min(w,wr) we have
(
n
`
)
choices for the
set of coordinates i such that xi = rk−i = 1, then
(
n−`
w
)
remaining choices for the set of
coordinates i such that xi = 1 and rk−i = 0, and finally
(
n−w
wr−`
)
remaining choices for the set
of coordinates i such that xi = 0 and rk−i = 1. Hence C` =
(
n
`
)(
n−`
w−`
)(
n−w
wr−`
)
. The formula
for p˜ follows.
3.2 Analysis of e′
Let x,y (resp. r1, r2) be independent random vectors chosen uniformly among all binary
vectors of weight w (resp. wr).
By independence of (x, r2) with (y, r1), the k-th coordinates of x · r2 and of r1 · y are
independent, and they are Bernoulli distributed with parameter p˜ by Proposition 3.1.1.
Therefore their modulo 2 sum t = x · r2 − r1 · y is Bernoulli distributed with{
Pr[tk = 1] = 2p˜(1− p˜),
Pr[tk = 0] = (1− p˜)2 + p˜2.
(4)
Finally, by adding modulo 2 coordinatewise the two independent vectors e and t, we
obtain the distribution of the coordinates of the error vector e′ = x · r2 − r1 · y + e given
by the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2.1. Let x,y be uniformly chosen among vectors of weight w, let r1, r2
be uniformly chosen among vectors of weight wr, and let e be uniformly chosen among
vectors of weight we. We suppose furthermore that the random vectors xv,y, r1, r2, e are
independent. Let e′ = x · r2− r1 ·y+ e = (e′0, . . . , e′n−1). Then, for every k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}
we have: {
Pr[e′k = 1] = 2p˜(1− p˜)(1− wen ) + ((1− p˜)2 + p˜2) wen ,
Pr[e′k = 0] = ((1− p˜)2 + p˜2) (1− wen ) + 2p˜(1− p˜)wen .
(5)
Proof. The vectors x · r2, r1 · y and e are clearly independent. The k-th coordinate of e is
Bernoulli distributed with parameter we/n. The random Bernoulli variable e′k is therefore
the sum modulo 2 of three independent Bernoulli variables of parameters p˜ for the first two
and of parameter we/n for the third one. The formula therefore follows standardly.
Proposition 3.2.1 gives us the probability that a coordinate of the error vector e′ is
1. In our simulations, which occur in the regime w = α
√
n with constant α, we make
the simplifying assumption that the coordinates of e′ are independent, meaning that the
weight of e′ follows a binomial distribution of parameter p?, where p? is defined as in Eq.
(5): p? = 2p˜(1 − p˜)(1 − we
n
) + ((1− p˜)2 + p˜2) we
n
. This approximation will give us, for
0 ≤ d ≤ min(2× w × wr + we, n),
Pr[ω(e′) = d] =
(
n
d
)
(p?)d(1− p?)(n−d). (6)
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3.3 Supporting elements for our modelization
we give in Fig. 2 and 3 simulations of the distribution of the weight of the error vector
together with the distribution of the associated binomial law of parameters p?. These
simulations show that error vectors are more likely to have a weight close to the mean than
predicted by the binomial distribution, and that on the contrary the error is less likely to
be of large weight than if it were binomially distributed. This is for instance illustrated
on parameters sets I and II corresponding to real parameters used for 128 bits security.
For cryptographic purposes we are mainly interested by very small DFR and large weight
occurences which are more likely to induce decoding errors. These tables show that the
probability of obtaining a large weight is close but smaller for the error weight distribution
of e′ rather than for the binomial approximation. This supports our modelization and
the fact that computing the decoding failure probability with this binomial approximation
permits to obtain an upper bound on the real DFR. This will be confirmed in the next
sections by simulations with real weight parameters (but smaller lengths).
Examples of simulations. We consider two examples of parameters in Table 1: Parameter
sets I and II which correspond to cryptographic parameters and for which we simulate
the error distribution versus the binomial approximation together with the probability of
obtaining large error weights. In order to follow [1] we computed vectors of length n (the
blocksize of the double circulant code) and then, for n1n2 the length of the auxiliary error
correcting code C, we truncated the last l = n− n1n2 bits before measuring the Hamming
weight of the vectors.
Parameter set w we = wr n n1n2 p?
I 67 77 23,869 23746 0.2918
II 67 77 20,533 20480 0.3196
Table 1: Parameters sets I and II used for simulations.
Simulations for Parameter set I. Simulation results are shown figure 2. We computed
the weights such that 0.1%, 0.01% and 0.001% of the vectors are of weight greater than this
value, to study how often extreme weight values occur in Table 2.
0.1% 0.01% 0.001% 0.0001%
Error vectors 7101 7134 7163 7190
Binomial approximation 7147 7191 7228 7267
Table 2: Simulated probabilities of large weights for Parameter Set I for the distributions
of the error vector and the binomial approximation.
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Figure 2: Comparaison between error e′ generated using parameter set I and its binomial
approximation.
Simulations for Parameter set 2. Simulation results are shown on figure 3. We perform
the same analysis as for the parameter set I about extreme weight values in Table 3.
Simulation results are shown on figure 3. We perform the same analysis as for the
parameter set I about extreme weight values in Table 2.
0.1% 0.01% 0.001% 0.0001%
Error vectors 6715 6749 6779 6808
Binomial approximation 6753 6796 6834 6859
Table 3: Simulated probabilities of large weights for Parameter Set II for the distributions
of the error vector and the binomial approximation.
As we can see from these, extreme weight values seem to happen more often in the case
of the binomial approximation. Since these cases are the most likely to lead to decoding
failure, this approximation should lead to conservative decryption failure rate estimations.
Comparison with the previous analysis in [1]: the present analysis is better than
the previous one, in practice in the case of decoding with BCH and repetition codes for
security parameter 128 bits, the present analysis leads to a DFR in 2−154 when the previous
one lead to 2−128. In practice this allows to reduce by 3% the key size in the case of the
BCH-repetition code decoder of [1].
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Figure 3: Comparaison between error e′ generated using parameter set II and its binomial
approximation.
4 Proposition of new auxiliary error-correcting codes:
Reed-Muller and Reed-Solomon concatenated codes
In this section we study the impact of using a new family of auxiliary error-coeecting codes:
instead of the tensor product codes used in the HQC cryptosystem framework we propose
to consider the concatenation of Reed-Muller and Reed-Solomon codes. We denote this
instanciation of the HQC framework by HQC-RMRS.
4.1 Construction
Definition 4.1.1. [Concatenated codes]
A concatenated code consists of an external code [ne, ke, de] over Fq and an internal code
[ni, ki, di] over F2, with q = 2ki. We use a bijection between elements of Fq and the words
of the internal code, this way we obtain a transformation:
Fneq → FN2
where N = neni. The external code is thus transformed into a binary code of parameters
[N = neni, K = keki, D > dedi].
For the external code, we chose a Reed-Solomon code of dimension 32 over F256 and,
for the internal code, we chose the Reed-Muller code [128, 8, 64] that we are going to
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duplicate between 2 and 6 times (i.e duplicating each bit to obtain codes of parameters
[256, 8, 128], [512, 8, 256], [786, 8, 384]).
Decoding: We perform maximum likelihood decoding on the internal code. This yields
a vector of Fneq that we then decode using an algebraic decoder for the Reed-Solomon code.
Decoding the internal Reed-Muller code: The Reed-Muller code of order 1 can
be decoded using a fast Hadamard transform (see chapter 14 of [2]). The algorithm needs
to be slightly adapted when decoding duplicated codes. For example, if the Reed-Muller of
length 128 = 27 is duplicated three times, we create the function F : F72 → {3, 1,−1,−3}
(which can be thought of as a 128-tuple of symbols from {3, 1,−1,−3}) by transforming
every block of three bits y1y2y3 of the received vector of length 384 to
(−1)y1 + (−1)y2 + (−1)y3 .
We then apply the Hadamard transform to the output of the function F . We take the
maximum value in Fˆ and x ∈ F1282 that maximizes the value of |Fˆ |. If Fˆ (x) is positive,
then the closest codeword is xG where G is the generator matrix of the Hadamard code
(without the all-one-vector). If Fˆ (x) is negative, then we need to add the all-one-vector to
it.
4.2 Decryption failure rate analysis
We now consider the decoding failure rate of the concatenated code which also corresponds
to the decryption failure rate of the encryption scheme. We first provide two bounds on the
maximum likelihood decoding error probability of the duplicated Reed-Muller code: a first
simple union bound and a second more accurate one. These bounds can then be plugged
into the decoding error probability for the bounded distance decoder of the Reed-Solomon
code.
Proposition 4.2.1. [Simple Upper Bound for the DFR of the internal code]
Let p be the transition probability of the binary symmetric channel. Then the DFR of a
duplicated Reed-Muller code of dimension 8 and minimal distance di can be upper bounded
by:
pi = 255
di∑
j=di/2
(
di
j
)
pj(1− p)di−j
Proof. For any linear code C of length n, when transmitting a codeword c, the probability
that the channel makes the received word y at least as close to a word c′ = c+ x as c (for
x a non-zero word of C and |x| the weight of x) is:∑
j>|x|/2
(|x|
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j.
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By the union bound applied on the different non-zero codewords x of C, we obtain that
the probability of a decryption failure can thus be upper bounded by:∑
x∈C,x6=0
∑
j>|x|/2
(|x|
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j
There are 255 non-zero words in a [128,8,64] Reed-Muller code, 254 of weight 64 and
one of weight 128. The contribution of the weight 128 vector is smaller than the weight 64
vectors, hence by applying the previous bound to duplicated Reed-Muller codes we obtain
the result.
Better upper bound on the decoding error probability for the internal code.
The previous simple bound pessimistically assumes that decoding fails when more than one
codeword minimizes the distance to the received vector. The following bound improves the
previous one by taking into account the fact that decoding can still succeed with probability
1/2 when exactly two codewords minimize the distance to the received vector.
Proposition 4.2.2. [Improved Upper Bound for the DFR of the internal code]
Let p be the transition probability of the binary symmetric channel. Then the DFR of a
Reed-Muller code of dimension 8 and minimal distance di can be upper bounded by:
pi =
1
2
255
(
di
di/2
)
pdi/2(1− p)di/2
+ 255
di∑
j=di/2+1
(
di
j
)
pj(1− p)d−j
+
1
2
(
255
2
) di/2∑
j=0
(
di/2
j
)3
pdi−j(1− p)di/2+j
Proof. Let E be the decoding error event. Let e be the error vector.
• Let A be the event where the closest non-zero codeword c to the error is such that
d(e, c) = d(e,0) = |e|.
• Let B be the event where the closest non-zero codeword c to the error vector is such
that d(e, c) < |e|.
• Let A′ ⊂ A be the event where the closest non-zero codeword c to the error vector
is such that d(e, c) = |e| and such a vector is unique, meaning that for every c′ ∈
C, c′ 6= c, c′ 6= 0, we have d(e, c′) > |e|.
• Finally, let A′′ be the event that is the complement of A′ in A, meaning the event
where the closest nonzero codeword c to the error is at distance |e| from e, and there
exists at least one codeword c′, c′ 6= c, c′ 6= 0, such that d(e, c′) = d(e, c) = |e|.
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The probability space is partitioned as Ω = A ∪ B ∪ C = A′ ∪ A′′ ∪ B ∪ C, where C
is the complement of A ∪ B. When C occurs, the decoder always decodes correctly, i.e.
P (E|C) = 0. We therefore write:
P (E) = P (E|A′)P (A′) + P (E|A′′)P (A′′) + P (E|B)P (B)
When the event A′ occurs, the decoder chooses at random between the two closest
codewords and is correct with probability 1/2, i.e. P (E|A′) = 1/2. We have P (E|B) = 1
and writing P (E|A′′) 6 1, we have:
P (E) 6 1
2
P (A′) + P (A′′) + P (B)
=
1
2
(P (A′) + P (A′′)) +
1
2
P (A′′) + P (B)
P (E) 6 1
2
P (A) +
1
2
P (A′′) + P (B) (7)
Now we have the straightforward union bounds:
P (B) 6 255
di∑
j=di/2+1
(
di
j
)
pj(1− p)d−j (8)
P (A) 6 255
(
di
di/2
)
pdi/2(1− p)di/2 (9)
and it remains to find an upper bound on P (A′′).
We have:
P (A′′) 6
∑
c,c′
P (Ac,c′)
where the sum is over pairs of distinct nonzero codewords and where:
Ac,c′ = {d(e, c) = d(e, c′) = |e|}
This event is equivalent to the error meeting the supports of c and c′ on exactly half
their coordinates. All codewords except the all-one vector have weight di, and any two
codewords of weight di either have non-intersecting supports or intersect in exactly d/2
positions. P (Ac,c′) is largest when c and c′ have weight d and non-zero intersection. In this
case we have:
P (Ac,c′) =
di/2∑
j=0
(
di/2
j
)3
pdi−j(1− p)di/2+j
Hence
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P (A′′) 6
∑
c,c′
P (Ac,c′) 6
(
255
2
) di/2∑
j=0
(
di/2
j
)3
pdi−j(1− p)di/2+j (10)
Plugging 9, 8 and 10 into 7 we obtain the result.
Remark 4.1. Propositions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 give upper bounds on the Decryption Failure
Rate for the internal code. The smaller the DFR, the closer the bounds become to the real
value. We give a comparison of the bounds from 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 and the actual DFR for
[256, 8, 128], [512, 8, 256] and [768, 8, 384] duplicated Reed-Muller using p? values from actual
parameters. Simulation results are presented in Table 4.
Security level p? Reed-Muller code DFR from 4.2.1 DFR from 4.2.2 Observed DFR
128 0.3196 [256, 8, 128] -7.84 -8.03 -8.72
192 0.3535 [512, 8, 256] -11.81 -12.12 -12.22
256 0.3728 [768, 8, 384] -13.90 -14.20 -14.25
Table 4: Comparison between the observed Decryption Failure Rate and the formula from
proposition 4.2.1. Results are presented as log2(DFR).
Remark 4.2. Propositions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 have been derived with a binary symmetric
channel model for the distribution of the HQC error vector restricted to the support of a
(duplicated) Reed-Muller code. Figure 4 compares the actual weight distribution of the error
vector to the binomial distribution when restricted to this relatively small number of bits.
We observe that they are virtually identical, meaning that a small proportion of HQC bits
do behave as i.i.d Bernoulli variables.
Theorem 4.3. [Decryption Failure Rate of the concatenated code]
Using a Reed-Solomon code [ne, ke, de]F256 as the external code, the DFR of the concate-
nated code can be upper bounded by:
ne∑
l=δe+1
(
ne
l
)
pli(1− pi)ne−l
Where de = 2δe + 1 and pi is defined as in Proposition4.2.1.
4.3 Simulation results
We tested the Decryption Failure rate of the concatenated codes against both binary sym-
metric channels and HQC vectors. For Reed-Muller codes, rather than considering the
upper bound approximation we effectively decoded the code, which means than in practice
the upper bound that we use for our theoretical DFR, is greater than what is obtained
in the simulations. Simulation results are presented on Figure 5. These results show that
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Figure 4: The binomial distribution vs the actual weight distribution of the HQC error
vector restricted to the support of a Reed-Muller code. Parameters correspond to parameter
set II, and the support length is 256.
the DFR of the encryption scheme is smaller than the simulated error with a binomial
distribution which is itself smaller than the DFR derived from the bound on the internal
duplicated Reed-Muller code.
4.4 Proposed parameters
From the DFR analysis we derive new parameters for the HQC-RMRS cryptosystem. These
are described on Figure 6.
5 Conclusion
In Section 3 we presented a better analysis of the error weight distribution for HQC, which
leads to a better DFR estimation. This can be used to reduce the size of the parameters,
no matter what family of codes is used for decoding. In Section 4 we propose using a
concatenation of Reed-Muller and Reed-Solomon codes and we provide an upper bound on
the DFR in this setting. This family allows us to reduce the public key and ciphertext sizes
by about 17% when compared to the tensor product of BCH and repetition codes (when
considering the same error weight distribution).
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Figure 5: Comparison of the Decryption Failure Rate of concatenated codes against approx-
imation by a binary symmetric channel and against HQC error vectors. Parameters simu-
lated are derived from those of HQC-RMRS for 128 security bits: w = 67, wr = we = 77,
a [256, 8, 128] duplicated Reed-Muller code for internal code and a [NRS, 32] Reed-Solomon
code for external code.
Instance security w we = wr Reed-Muller Reed Solomon n DFR Gain over [1]
HQC-RMRS-128 128 67 77 [256, 8, 128] [80, 32, 49] 20,533 < 2−128 16.8%
HQC-RMRS-192 192 101 117 [512, 8, 256] [76, 32, 45] 38,923 < 2−192 16.7%
HQC-RMRS-256 256 133 153 [768, 8, 384] [78, 32, 47] 59,957 < 2−256 15.4%
Figure 6: New proposed parameters for the HQC-RMRS cryptosystem (security is in bits).
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